I’ve been reading, “They Will Have to Die Now: Mosul and the Fall of the Caliphate,” by James Verini. It’s a detailed human analysis of the war in Iraq, chocked full of historical detail about the Middle East. Verini cited Robert Taber’s “The War of the Flea” as the most important guideline for guerrilla movements and insurgencies. Of course, that was my next book order.
But before reading the book, I had GPT 5 give me a summary. That summary follows. These strategies also apply to business and organizations. First let’s consider a summary of Taber.
In the next post, we’ll examine how a small business could use this stragegy.
Let me know what you think.
Grant
Summary of Robert Taber’s “The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice (1965).”
Core Thesis
Taber argues that guerrilla war is the “war of the flea”: a small, agile force persistently harasses a larger, slower “dog” (the state) until the dog exhausts itself. The guerrilla does not aim to win by decisive battles; he wins by endurance, dispersion, political mobilization, and time, gradually eroding the opponent’s will and legitimacy.
Why Guerrillas Win (or Don’t)
Taber says successful insurgencies rest on four interlocking conditions:
A compelling political grievance or cause. Without a resonant cause, military action cannot mobilize the people.
Popular support—active or passive. Even a minority’s quiet sympathy can be enough to provide recruits, shelter, food, money, and intelligence.
Favorable terrain and safe havens. Rugged countryside, borders, or urban anonymity give the “flea” places to hide, rest, and reappear.
Time and patience. Insurgents win by not losing; the state loses by failing to win quickly. Prolongation favors the guerrilla.
Strategy: Politics First, Tactics Second
Political primacy. Guerrilla war is fundamentally a political struggle. Operations are designed to dramatize injustice, provoke overreaction, and expand the movement’s support.
Organization in cells. Small, compartmentalized units prevent infiltration from collapsing the whole network.
Propaganda and psychological warfare. Each skirmish is a message: the regime is vulnerable, change is possible.
Provoking missteps. Repression that harms civilians turns “neutrals” into sympathizers—precisely what the guerrilla wants.
The “Flea’s” Method
Harassment over confrontation. Ambushes, sabotage, hit-and-run raids, selective assassinations, and economic disruption sap the state’s strength.
Mobility and surprise. Speed, concealment, and initiative offset the enemy’s numbers and firepower.
Elastic logistics. Guerrillas draw supplies from the population and captured materiel rather than fixed supply lines.
Escalating cycles. Small attacks create political effects disproportionate to their size; each cycle of repression and resistance grows the movement.
Rural vs. Urban Insurgency
Rural focus. Drawing on Cuba, China, and Vietnam, Taber highlights how rural base areas allow training, indoctrination, and gradual expansion.
Urban possibilities. He also notes urban guerrilla tactics (e.g., Algeria, Cyprus) that exploit density, anonymity, and symbolic targets—but with higher risks of penetration and civilian backlash.
Stages of Insurrection (as Taber frames them)
Latent/incipient phase. Political agitation, recruitment, building clandestine cells, testing minor actions.
Guerrilla phase. Persistent harassment, propaganda victories, selective attacks to erode the regime’s control and confidence.
Transition to mobile/regular warfare (if feasible). As strength grows, insurgents may field larger units or catalyze a decisive political collapse. In some cases, victory is political rather than military (government withdrawal, negotiated transfer of power).
Case Studies Taber Uses
Cuban Revolution (Castro’s 26th of July Movement). Demonstrates how a small rural foco can exploit regime weakness and public anger.
Vietnam. Illustrates political primacy, peasant support, and the limits of conventional power against a patient insurgency.
Algeria (FLN) and others (e.g., EOKA in Cyprus). Show the potency—and dangers—of urban tactics and the role of external sanctuaries and international opinion.
Why States Struggle Against “Fleas”
Mismatch of doctrine. Conventional armies are built to seize territory and destroy massed forces, not to police dispersed networks.
Legitimacy dilemmas. Force sufficient to suppress insurgents often alienates the population; restraint can be portrayed as weakness.
Intelligence deficits. Without human intelligence from locals, sophisticated technology rarely finds small, fluid cells.
Cost curves. Protecting “everything” is prohibitively expensive; guerrillas can strike “anywhere, anytime” at low cost.
Taber’s Counterinsurgency Prescriptions
Win legitimacy, not just battles. Address root grievances with credible reforms, justice, economic relief, and political inclusion.
Protect and persuade the population. Security for civilians, disciplined troops, and legal accountability deny guerrillas recruiting narratives.
Intelligence and police work over large-unit sweeps. Precision, not brute force, and careful separation of insurgents from their support base.
Unified political-military strategy. Coherent leadership and messaging; avoid the whiplash of alternating between repression and neglect.
Limits and Critiques (contextualizing Taber)
Romanticizing insurgency? Some critics argue Taber underplays fracture, criminality, and coercion within rebel movements.
State capacity variance. His template fits weak or delegitimized regimes best; strong, reformist states can blunt insurgencies earlier.
Ethical ambiguities. Both sides may employ methods that impose heavy civilian costs; Taber notes this but focuses on strategic logic.
Lasting Takeaways
Asymmetry is more than size—it’s political stamina. The side that aligns operations with a resonant cause and can endure time’s costs has the edge.
Every tactical action is a strategic message. Insurgents and counterinsurgents are running parallel campaigns for narrative dominance.
Reform can be a weapon. Meeting legitimate demands can separate the guerrilla from the people more effectively than firepower.
(My perspective for your work)
GPT’s opinion: For leaders and consultants, The War of the Flea remains valuable beyond military contexts. It’s a playbook for how small, networked actors can outmaneuver larger institutions by mobilizing stakeholders, controlling tempo, and forcing costly overreactions. In organizational change:
“Guerrilla” reformers (internal innovators) succeed when they connect to a real felt need, build coalitions, and choose actions that create positive demonstration effects.
Heavy-handed organizational responses (blanket bans, punitive policies) often strengthen informal resistance.
The counter to “organizational insurgency” is legitimacy: authentic engagement, targeted fixes, and visible wins that restore trust.